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the mainstream of philosophy of religion as the mainstream in analytical 
philosophy is anti-Wittgensteinian (pp. 189-211). Against this sceptical 
denial of Wittgenstein, Fronda tries to show again that there are already 
important theological roots for Wittgenstein’s thinking in medieval 
philosophy – especially in the platonic line of thinking. In this tradition 
God is conceived as ontologically, epistemologically and semantically 
transcendent (p. 204). Although this tradition obviously exists in 
Christianity, I  wonder whether the wholly-otherness of God really is 
a very convincing approach to theology. It seems to me that especially 
the later Wittgenstein also offers other ways for theology, and Fronda 
does not choose the most convincing one. Thus, Fronda’s last defence 
of Wittgenstein in his concluding remarks (pp. 213-229) certainly is 
a  legitimate and possible interpretation of Wittgenstein – considering 
especially the work of the early Wittgenstein. but whether there is no 
alternative to the idea that Wittgenstein’s point of view is the point of 
view of apophatic theology seems to be highly doubtable, in my opinion, 
in medieval thinking.
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Theology, Evolution and the Mind (henceforth Tem) is an edited volume 
that contains the papers presented in the conference of the Science and 
Religion Forum in Canterbury in 2007. The volume tackles highly topical 
and controversial issues in theology and science: the nature of biological 
evolution and its theological implications, theological anthropology in the 
context of human evolution and the nature of human minds and brains. 
These issues are crucial for science, philosophy and theology, and deserve 
extensive, rigorous and critical treatment. unfortunately, this is what the 
volume, for the most part, cannot offer. The book is all too short to deal 
extensively with the issues it raises. Further, the articles are very uneven 
with respect to scope and the level of argumentation, and lack much 
needed philosophical rigor. but perhaps the value of an edited volume 
does not lie in its coherence and length only, but in the strength of the 
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individual contributions therein. Here, Tem holds little surprises: there 
are some interesting exchanges and ideas, but hardly any innovations.
The first exchange of the book is between the cognitive archeologist 
Steven mithen and theologian Celia Deane-Drummond. In his paper 
The Prehistory of the Religious Mind, Steven mithen briefly goes through 
his theory of the emergence of culture and language. According to 
him, the religious mind emerges when both culture and mind emerge 
in human history. early hominids, such as Homo ergaster and Homo 
neanderthalensis, did not have religion or culture in the same sense that 
later Homo sapiens had. The crucial difference between Homo sapiens 
and its ancestors is that Homo sapiens evolved towards larger group 
sizes. This also led to the development of a more sophisticated cognitive 
architecture and theory of mind. It was the theory of mind in conjunction 
with what mithen calls cognitive fluidity that made religion, culture and 
language possible.
one of mithen’s arguments deserves some criticism here. He himself 
puts the argument like this. It is a fact, mithen notes, that religiosity is 
a  pervasive and ubiquitous feature of human societies. This fact can 
be explained in two different ways. According to the first, there exists 
a supernatural realm inhabited by a supernatural agent (or agents) that 
has the power to act in the natural world or even create it. If this expla-
nation is true, then religion is not natural, but supernatural and God(s) 
exists. but there is an alternative: what if the pervasiveness of religiosity 
is just due to the fact that the human mind is prone to believe in the 
supernatural and “on-going activity of the universe and life are explained 
by entirely natural processes” (p. 11)?
What we have here is a  very typical evolutionary debunking 
argument of religion. If it is the case that religion has natural origins, 
that is, its emergence can be explained naturalistically, there is no good 
reason to believe in the supernatural. In her response Whence Comes 
Religion, Celia Deane-Drummond points out the shortcomings of this 
naïve opposition. First of all, it might be the case (as far as we know) that 
God exists, but does not interfere with the emergence of religion in any 
way detectable by science. Second, the fact that the theory of mind and 
cognitive fluidity are necessary for religion does not mean that they are 
sufficient and causally explain all forms of religious action and thought. 
Given that many contemporary theologians tend to accept, for the most 
part, that human beings and their brains have indeed evolved and were 
not created by God in a  single creative act, mithen’s argument does 
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not have force against them. one point that Deane-Drummond does 
not mention but could be made here is that even if it is the case that all 
religions everywhere are completely natural and we could know this, we 
could still have other evidence to support, say, theism. A  theist could 
argue, e.g., that the existence of the universe and the fine-tuning of its 
constants make theism at least as probable as naturalism. Finally, Deane-
Drummond also points out that there are viable scientific criticisms of 
evolutionary psychology.
lluis oviedo provides a wider perspective by describing the diversity 
of contemporary approaches to the evolution of religion. He points 
out that mithen’s theory is only one theory in a  family of theories. 
Commitment theories aim to explain the evolution of religion in terms of 
its adaptive benefits to individuals by enhancing cooperation in human 
groups. Cognitive theories, such as mithen’s theory, explain religion as 
a  by-product of mental systems that evolved for some non-religious 
purpose. Finally, oviedo also argues (pace mithen) that contemporary 
naturalistic study of religion is much impaired by its disregard of 
conscious thinking, religious emotions and religious experience.
Another interesting exchange in Tem is between Neil Spurway 
and his commentator Derek Stanesby. In his paper What Can Evolved 
Minds Know of God, Spurway argues that since our brains are a product 
of natural selection, we cannot have any confidence in their ability 
to acquire knowledge about God (or anything else metaphysical or 
ultimate). Spurway claims that our mental mechanisms and their outputs 
(concepts and beliefs) have been selected for in our natural history. only 
the fact that they have been selected for makes them trustworthy as 
sources of knowledge about the world. but they have not been selected 
for in order to produce beliefs about religion, metaphysics or anything 
else that goes beyond everyday human environment. In other words, our 
cognitive systems are not designed to produce knowledge about worlds 
beyond our everyday world (e.g., the world of ideas and abstractions 
beyond time and space). From this Spurway draws the conclusion that 
our minds are incapable of gaining knowledge in these domains.
I  am not sure whether Spurway realizes the consequences of his 
argument. If the argument goes through, there is no trusting any concept 
or belief that goes beyond our everyday interest in survival and sex. 
This would rule out at least some scientific beliefs, not to mention most 
ethical, aesthetic and philosophical beliefs. This point is also made by 
his respondent Derek Stanesby, according to whom “it is one thing ‘to 
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urge a strenuous opposition to dogmatism in any form – fundamentalist 
or hierarchical’ but entirely other to demand the elimination of all 
metaphysical conjectures and attempts to understand the world in 
theological terms. The rejection of anything that goes beyond science 
(meta physics) places us in the unimaginable bleak world of logical 
positivism and scientism” (p. 102).
Furthermore, Spurway’s argument seems to make a  questionable 
jump from the fact that our brains have evolved to the conclusion that 
our minds cannot have access to information that our brains did not 
evolve to process. Why should we believe this? And further, how does 
Spurway know this, if it is the case that his mind (as well as ours) cannot 
gain knowledge beyond our everyday world. If one wants to defend 
the possibility of achieving metaphysical or religious knowledge, it is 
enough that concepts and beliefs about such matters are to some extent 
similar to our everyday concepts and beliefs. Spurway has not in any way 
shown that the contrary is the case. Finally, Stanesby also points out how 
Spurway fatally confuses our concepts as a product of culture and our 
brains as a product of natural selection. The brain has indeed evolved, 
but the concepts that we use to carve up the world are mostly culturally 
formed. So the fact that our brains evolved to process information of 
a  certain type does not entail that we cannot form concepts that are 
based on other types of information.
It seems to me that the debate between Spurway and Stanesby is 
mostly grounded in confusions created by what they call evolutionary 
epistemology. As most contemporary analytic philosophers have left 
evolutionary epistemology behind anyway, this debate gives all the more 
reason to look elsewhere for viable epistemological frameworks. This is, 
of course, not to say that the fact that our brains have evolved should 
have no impact in epistemology, but rather that the attempt to create 
a  Darwinian epistemology (e.g., Peter munz) in which the truth (or 
falsity) of our beliefs is somehow guaranteed by their adaptive value (or 
the lack of it) should be considered as a failure.
In his paper Are We Ghosts or Machines? roger Trigg explores the 
evolution of the mind and the constraints that it presents to our view of 
humans. Given the fact that most contributions in Tem attempt to make 
theological content compatible with naturalism as far as possible, it is 
surprising that Trigg defends the idea that we humans consist at least 
partly of a non-physical soul. Trigg argues that only mind/body dualism 
is able do justice to our experience of ourselves as having unitary selves 
212 booK reVIeWS AND NoTICeS
and the multi-faceted reality surrounding us. He goes on to claim that 
the notions of God and afterlife are much more difficult to understand if 
some sort of materialism or physicalism is accepted. As far as theism is 
concerned, God will remain as a spiritual being that cannot be reduced to 
anything physical or immanent. Trigg maintains that attempts to combine 
theism with mind/body physicalism face considerable difficulties, one 
of these being the philosophical instability of non-reductive versions of 
physicalism and another being ontological parsimony. Trigg approvingly 
quotes Charles Taliaferro, according to whom “a  theistic outlook will 
provide a  fuller model of explanation in which the natural emergence 
of the mental from the physical, and indeed the very constitution and 
powers of the physical world itself, is seen as stemming, from a deeper, 
underlying cause” (p. 117).
In her response to Trigg’s paper, Anne runehov criticizes Trigg for 
setting up false dualisms between mind and body as well as God and 
world. Her own view as that the universe does not consist of two types 
“stuff ”, but is instead a nested hierarchy of increasingly complex parts and 
wholes. This includes both human selves and God. runehov, therefore, 
seems to adhere to a view that could be classified as some kind of non-
reductive physicalism combined with panentheism. In non-reductive 
materialism, the self consists of the physical operations of the brain 
but is not identical with them. Human selves emerge from the complex 
interactions between our environment and brains. Furthermore, selves, 
although composed of physical interactions, are highly complex entities 
that are not reducible to their parts. This assumption, she claims, is 
supported by neuroscience whereas dualism is not. but this is just what 
Trigg criticized in his paper; according to him, we are no closer in 
understanding how selves emerge from matter or how matter has the 
power to produce such things now than we were 30 years ago before the 
breakthroughs of neuroscience. Trigg insists that neuroscience does not 
force us to physicalism, the choice is philosophical and should be made 
on philosophical grounds.
runehov seems to think that panentheism provides a  kind of 
non-reductive materialist solution for the God/world relationship. In 
panetheism, the physical world is part of God, but God somehow extends 
beyond the physical world. The problem is, however, that the God/world 
relationship differs in many ways from the mind/body relationship. In 
panentheism, God is supposed to be “bigger than” the world. This does 
not answer the ultimate question of what God is. Classical theism has, as 
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Trigg points out, an answer to this, but panentheism, at least as runehov 
presents it, does not. If the panentheist wants to hold onto creation ex 
nihilo and the ultimacy of God, she has to, in one way or another, be able 
to say that God is at least partly composed of something else than the 
stuff of the natural world. Well, what is it? In the case of the mind/body 
relationship, this is not a problem, because it does not require mental to 
be ultimate. It can be claimed that the lower levels of the natural world 
have intrinsic powers to produce higher levels of complexity which also 
gives rise to minds and selves. because theism insists on the ultimacy of 
God, this move is not possible with respect to the God/world relationship 
without giving up creation ex nihilo and God’s transcendence altogether. 
There is, of course, the process theology option, but I  suspect that 
runehov does not want to go there. What I am trying to say here is that 
even if runehov can have her cake and eat it in the mind/body issue 
by advocating non-reductive physicalism, similar moves are extremely 
difficult to make in the case of the God/world relationship.
In conclusion, I will briefly say a few words about the contributions 
that deal with what could be called the theology of evolution. In short, my 
point here is that Tem offers nothing new on this front. Jeremy law, who 
in his article Unfolding Conversation attempts to find some consonance 
between the nature of God and the nature of the evolving creation (and 
humans), argues, along with Fraser Watts’ article, that from a theistic point 
of view evolution can be seen as having a general direction. Contrary to 
what Stephen Jay Gould and several others have claimed, both law and 
Watts invoke Simon Conway morris’ work on convergent evolution to 
show that the evolutionary process has inherent constraints and ends up 
producing certain designs more than others. Since something like Homo 
sapiens (although not exactly like it) are bound to emerge by natural 
selection sooner or later, God can be conceived as using this process for 
the creation of human and animal organisms. This is what is generally 
as the “freedom within a  form” or “law and contingency” approach to 
theistic evolution. law then combines this approach with the idea of 
the Trinity and the relational nature of humanity to produce a view in 
which the natural world and its organisms unfold in an open-ended 
conversation between the world and God. As I said, the view of theistic 
evolution emerging from law and Fraser is a pretty standard one. one 
surprising fact is that neither Watts nor law employs the notion of 
physical fine-tuning in their theology of evolution. Several recent models 
of theistic evolution, such as Alister mcGrath’s, have made extensive 
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use of this idea. This move would have given both Watts and law more 
philosophical depth.
In addition to being fragmented, uneven and sometimes loosely 
argued, Tem also suffers from shoddy presentation and copy editing. 
Sometimes authors make references to books or articles that are not 
listed in the bibliography, and sometimes information is missing from 
the footnotes. even a non-native english speaker (like me) can identify 
numerous spelling errors and mistakes in the text. Some contributions 
(especially the short papers at the end of the book) could have been 
greatly improved by heavy-handed copy editing. As they stand, some of 
them look rather more like lecture notes with lists of topics that should be 
discussed than polished articles in an edited volume. Despite containing 
a few interesting and fiery exchanges, Tem has so many problems that the 
philosophically oriented reader in need of good material on evolution, 
theology and the mind should look elsewhere.
